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Reuven Brandt on anonymity and mitochondrial donation
Much ethical debate has surrounded the UK’s recent decision to permit the use of mitochondrial
transfer techniques in human subjects. What makes mitochondrial transfer ethically controversial is
that while mitochondria are organelles found in the cytoplasm of cells, they contain their own DNA
that is distinct from the DNA found in the nucleus of cells. Consequently, the children created
following mitochondrial transfer end up inheriting DNA from three individuals—the mitochondrial
donor as well as the individuals who provide the usual maternal and paternal contributions of DNA.
The media’s treatment of the subject has tended to focus on whether mitochondrial transfer
techniques are a kind of genetic modiﬁcation that we should eschew on principle, and whether the
creation of so-called ‘three-parent babies’ is the thin-edge-of-the-wedge into an era of wide-spread
human genetic engineering. While these are indeed interesting and important questions, here I
want to focus on a more narrow policy question given that mitochondrial transfer has been
approved for human use in the UK. That question is whether mitochondrial donors ought to be
considered akin to gamete donors (donors of sperm and eggs whose nuclear DNA is passed on to
offspring) when it comes to children’s right to access identifying information about their ‘genetic’
parents.
While UK law permits children created using donor gametes to apply for access to identifying
information about their donor(s) once they reach 18, no such right has been extended to
information about mitochondrial donors. I think that this decision to permit anonymous
mitochondrial donation is the right way to go—for the record, I also think that anonymous sperm
and ova donation should be permitted, but that is a separate issue. However, I also think that the
arguments offered in its defence have been rather weak. After brieﬂy explaining why I take issue
with the arguments in favour of anonymous mitochondrial donation that have been offered so far, I
will then offer some reasons for why we are justiﬁed in treating mitochondrial donation differently
than gamete donation when it comes to anonymity. Before getting to the arguments though, I will
ﬁrst give a bit of background biology that will help illustrate why the question of donor anonymity
arises in the ﬁrst place.
While most of our DNA resides in the nucleus of our cells, a small portion (37 of the approximately
30,000 genes that makeup the human genome) resides in mitochondria. Whereas nuclear DNA is
almost identical in all cells of the body, individuals can have multiple different mitochondrial
genomes, even in the same cell. The ratio of different mitochondrial variants can differ from cell to
cell. Additionally, while an individual’s nuclear DNA is a mix of paternal and maternal nuclear DNA,
individuals’ mitochondrial DNA is made up from the particular mix of mitochondrial genomes found
within the mitochondria of the ovum from which they developed. Consequently, mitochondrial DNA
inheritance is strictly maternal, but offspring can have a different ratio of mitochondrial DNA
variants than their mothers, depending on the distribution of mitochondrial variations present in a
particular ovum.
We might think that mitochondrial donors are somewhat similar to gamete donors because they
pass on some of their DNA to the children they help create, and this mitochondrial DNA can in turn
be passed along to future generations—at least in the case of female offspring. If the legal right to
know identifying information about one’s progenitors is grounded in genetic relatedness, then there
seems to be a prima facie case to treat mitochondrial donors like gamete donors with respect to
anonymity.
Proponents of mitochondrial donor anonymity (for example, the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) and the Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics) have advanced two principle
arguments for why anonymity should be permitted in the case of mitochondrial donation, even
though it is not permitted in the case of sperm and egg donation. The ﬁrst is that the DNA in
mitochondria does not encode resemblances in personal characteristics between donor and
resultant child, and the second is that mitochondrial donation does not establish a unique genetic
link between donor and progenitor. However, both these justiﬁcation are vulnerable to serious
objections.
First, consider the claim about resemblances between mitochondrial donors and resultant
offspring. While neither the HFEA or the Nufﬁeld Council offer a clear deﬁnition of ‘personal
characteristics’, we can safely presume that certain traits, like those effecting personality and
behaviour, would likely count. The strength of this ﬁrst argument thus rests on what the biological
sciences say about the role mitochondrial DNA plays in the development and transmission of
these traits.
Though our understanding of the role mitochondria play in complex traits (like personality,
cognitive ability, and so on) is in its infancy, there is some evidence suggesting that mitochondrial
DNA may inﬂuence extraversion, susceptibility to certain degenerative neurological disorders, and
susceptibility to certain psychiatric disorders. To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is
deﬁnitive evidence that mitochondrial DNA is involved in these characteristics, only that it is still
very much an open question. If it turns out that mitochondrial DNA is in fact important in the
development of complex traits, then mitochondrial donation may very well result in certain
resemblances between donors and their offspring. My chief worry about this argument then is that
it rests on empirical claims about the phenotypic effects of mitochondrial DNA that remain to be
settled.
The second argument, that anonymous mitochondrial donation is permissible because no unique
genetic connection is established between donor and offspring, suffers from a theoretical
weakness rather than an empirical one. No deﬁnition of ‘unique genetic connection’ is provided,
but presumably what the Nufﬁeld Committee has in mind is something like the following: since
mitochondrial DNA is strictly maternally inherited, all of a mitochondrial donor’s close maternal
relations will have very similar mitochondrial DNA. Consequently, any child that receives
mitochondria from a donor in fact receives particular mitochondrial DNA that is common to
individuals other than the donor.
The chief problem with this argument is that it seems that lack of a unique genetic connection does
not alter any right to access identifying information about a genetic progenitor. For instance,
imagine that a sperm donor is one of a set of monozygotic (identical) triplets. Any nuclear DNA that
subsequent child inherits from this donor is also common to the donor’s monozygotic siblings;
however, this does not seem to diminish the child’s right to identifying information about the donor.
It would seem wrong to give most donor-conceived children access to identifying information about
their gamete donor, while denying this information to donor-conceived children whose donor
happens to have a monozygotic sibling.
Though these two arguments do not succeed in showing that we ought to treat mitochondrial
donors differently from gamete donors when it comes to anonymity, we can still be consistent while
permitting anonymous mitochondrial donation but not anonymous gamete donation. This is
because many of the arguments advanced against donor anonymity in the case of gamete
donation do not equally apply to mitochondrial donation. Though I cannot go through all the
arguments here, I think the following examples are sufﬁcient to shift the burden of proof to those
who think that anonymity should not be permitted in mitochondrial donation.
First, consider David Velleman’s claim that contact with one’s genetic relations is important
because crucial self-knowledge is gained through contact with those whom we resemble. On his
view, disclosure of identifying information would be important as a (perhaps distant) ‘second best’
to being raised by one’s genetic parents because it at least offers an avenue for children to attempt
to initiate contact with their progenitors later in life. Even if we grant Velleman his controversial
view about self-knowledge and genetic ties, there is still reason to the think the case for disclosure
is much weaker in the case of mitochondrial donation. This is because even though mitochondrial
DNA may result in resemblances that are important to self-knowledge, the majority of inherited
traits are likely transmitted via nuclear DNA. Furthermore, children created using donor
mitochondrial DNA are likely to be raise by their nuclear DNA progenitors—the main purpose of
mitochondrial donation, after all, is to allow women to have genetically related children while
minimizing the risk of transmitting mitochondrial disease to their offspring. Consequently, a child
created using donor mitochondria will likely still develop intimate relationships with the genetic
progenitors responsible for the vast majority of their inherited traits. Given that there is less of a
loss of the crucial good—namely, self-knowledge—it may well be the case that other interests,
such as those of the intending parents and mitochondrial donors themselves, supersede the
interests of children to have access to identifying information about their donor.
Second, if we think that any harms that might arise from lack of knowledge about one’s genetic
progenitors are socially constructed rather than grounded in biological facts, there are also
reasons to think that there will be substantial asymmetries between gamete donation and
mitochondrial donation. Consider that up until recently it has not been possible to separate the
transmission of the maternal complement of nuclear DNA from the transmission of mitochondria,
nor has any importance been traditionally placed on mitochondrial inheritance. Both the HFEA and
Nufﬁeld reports, for example, state that mitochondrial donation ought to be seen as different in kind
from standard gamete donation when it comes to disclosure of information. By contrast, in the
West, rearing arrangements that involved individuals other than a gestational mother and the
child’s genetic father carried with them certain stigmas for both the parents (for example, shame
and condemnation associated with reproduction outside of marriage) and child (for example,
illegitimacy, and its legal and social consequences). It is thus unclear whether any socially
constructed desire ‘to know’ and related frustration and distress some children created via donor
gametes experience will equally arise in children created via donor mitochondria. We cannot
simply assume that the experience of children created via anonymous mitochondria donation will
parallel that of children created as a product of anonymous gamete donation. Consequently,
arguments against anonymous gamete donation that are based on the emotional distress reported
by children who have a deep desire ‘to know’ cannot be extended a priori to anonymous
mitochondrial donation.
What I hope I have managed to show is that while two inﬂuential arguments offered in favour of
mitochondrial donor anonymity are not fully convincing, there other reasons to think that we can
permit mitochondrial donor anonymity while at the same time reject anonymity in gamete donation.
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